A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value
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Publication:2867523
DOI10.1515/bejte-2012-0006zbMath1278.91081OpenAlexW2094045559MaRDI QIDQ2867523
Publication date: 19 December 2013
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://gredi.recherche.usherbrooke.ca/wpapers/GREDI-1029.pdf
Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57)
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