A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions

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Publication:3115461

DOI10.1287/mnsc.1040.0334zbMath1232.91317OpenAlexW2112959886MaRDI QIDQ3115461

Anthony M. Kwasnica, Dave Porter, Christine Demartini, John O. Ledyard

Publication date: 21 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80271/




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