A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information

DOI10.2307/1910414zbMath0415.90100OpenAlexW2018815533WikidataQ56481596 ScholiaQ56481596MaRDI QIDQ3205062

Paul R. Milgrom

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1910414

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsdifferential informationconvergence theoremBayesian gamescompetitive biddingimperfect information games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Central limit and other weak theorems (60F05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (23)

Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions ⋮ The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium ⋮ On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions ⋮ A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation ⋮ I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions ⋮ Trade of a common value good ⋮ Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction ⋮ Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions ⋮ Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders ⋮ The insider's curse ⋮ Asymmetric English auctions. ⋮ Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions ⋮ Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets ⋮ Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection ⋮ Convergence results for unanimous voting ⋮ Jury theorems with multiple alternatives ⋮ Equilibrium transformations and the revenue equivalence theorem ⋮ Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts ⋮ Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids ⋮ Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions ⋮ Revisiting the convergence theorem for competitive bidding in common value auctions ⋮ Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders ⋮ Common-value auctions with discrete private information

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