The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms

DOI10.2307/2297433zbMath0554.90010OpenAlexW2081158790WikidataQ59973102 ScholiaQ59973102MaRDI QIDQ3217868

William Thomson

Publication date: 1984

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297433

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriamanipulabilityresource allocation mechanismsWalrasian correspondencemanipulation games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (20)

Coalition formation in games of fair division ⋮ The manipulability of the Shapley-value ⋮ Credible implementation ⋮ Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers ⋮ Games of manipulation in marriage problems ⋮ Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies ⋮ Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Reversal of asymmetries of allocation mechanisms under manipulation ⋮ Are incentives against economic justice? ⋮ Let them cheat! ⋮ Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem ⋮ Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation ⋮ Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods ⋮ Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies ⋮ Strategy-proof risk sharing ⋮ Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism ⋮ Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences ⋮ Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization

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