Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation

DOI10.7916/D86T0ZVZ 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00694.x; 10.7916/D86T0ZVZzbMath1152.91319OpenAlexW2168457551MaRDI QIDQ3418481

Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim

Publication date: 5 February 2007

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00694.x

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchical delegationsubgroup collusionrobustly collusion-proof implementation, pairwise identifiability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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