COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY
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Publication:3444827
DOI10.1142/S0219198906001144zbMath1274.91044MaRDI QIDQ3444827
Publication date: 5 June 2007
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cooperative games (91A12) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Matching models (91B68)
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