The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information

DOI10.2307/2951740zbMath0806.90136OpenAlexW1980335314MaRDI QIDQ4302554

Quan Wen

Publication date: 27 September 1994

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951740

zbMATH Keywords

complete informationdiscountingfolk theoremseffective minimax payoffsubgame perfect equilibria in repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (21)

Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring ⋮ On asynchronously repeated games ⋮ Asymmetric finite punishments in repeated games ⋮ Asymmetric punishments for group deviations in the infinitely repeated Cournot model ⋮ On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting ⋮ Stability in repeated matching markets ⋮ Optimal strategies for selecting coordinators ⋮ Individual best response in the repeated Cournot model ⋮ Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter? ⋮ Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities ⋮ The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games ⋮ Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring ⋮ A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors ⋮ Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem ⋮ Myopic perception in repeated games ⋮ Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games ⋮ Switching costs in infinitely repeated games

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