A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games

DOI10.1051/ro/2017024zbMath1419.91044OpenAlexW2605083718MaRDI QIDQ4611491

Deng-Feng Li, Xun-Feng Hu

Publication date: 18 January 2019

Published in: RAIRO - Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2017024

zbMATH Keywords

TU gameequal division valueequal surplus division valuenullifying playerdummifying player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value ⋮ Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
• A new basis and the Shapley value
• Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
• Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
• Axioms of invariance for TU-games
• Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• Axiomatizations and a Noncooperative Interpretation of the α-CIS Value

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