COMPARING POWER INDICES
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Publication:2854003
DOI10.1142/S0219198913400045zbMath1274.91037MaRDI QIDQ2854003
Cesarino Bertini, Izabella Stach, Gianfranco Gambarelli, Josep Freixas
Publication date: 17 October 2013
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cooperative games (91A12) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Voting theory (91B12)
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Cites Work
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- Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal
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- Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
- Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman Index
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