A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3703541
DOI10.1287/OPRE.32.2.390zbMath0581.90008OpenAlexW2117179049MaRDI QIDQ3703541
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.2.390
existenceuniquenessCournot oligopolymarket structureduopolyStackelberg modelcomputation of an equilibrium solutionmultiple leader-follower model
Related Items (45)
Solving quadratic multi-leader-follower games by smoothing the follower's best response ⋮ Reflexive games in the linear Stackelberg duopoly models under incoincident reflexion ranks ⋮ Bilevel and multilevel programming: A bibliography review ⋮ The polynomial hierarchy and a simple model for competitive analysis ⋮ Model LSFE with Conjectural Variations for Electricity Forward Market ⋮ A two stage stochastic equilibrium model for electricity markets with two way contracts ⋮ Analysis on the forward market equilibrium model ⋮ Finding optimal strategies in a multi-period multi-leader-follower Stackelberg game using an evolutionary algorithm ⋮ Multi-leader multi-follower model with aggregative uncertainty ⋮ Basic theoretical foundations and insights on bilevel models and their applications to power systems ⋮ Three modeling paradigms in mathematical programming ⋮ Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs ⋮ Game theory on the blockchain: a model for games with smart contracts ⋮ Welfare-Improving Effect of a Small Number of Followers in a Stackelberg Model ⋮ Equilibrium selection in multi-leader-follower games with vertical information ⋮ On hierarchical competition in oligopoly ⋮ Nonlinear dynamics of discrete time multi-level leader-follower games ⋮ Regularized Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints with Application to Energy Markets ⋮ Existence and continuity theorems of \(\alpha\)-core of multi-leader-follower games with set payoffs ⋮ Multilevel multi-leader multiple-follower games with nonseparable objectives and shared constraints ⋮ Complexity guarantees for an implicit smoothing-enabled method for stochastic MPECs ⋮ On the computation of equilibria in monotone and potential stochastic hierarchical games ⋮ Manifolds of multi-leader Cournot equilibria. ⋮ On the Inefficiency of Forward Markets in Leader–Follower Competition ⋮ A shared-constraint approach to multi-leader multi-follower games ⋮ Variational inequality formulation of a class of multi-leader-follower games ⋮ Stackelberg versus Cournot: a differential game approach ⋮ A leader-follower model and analysis for a two-stage network of oligopolies ⋮ Global optimization of concave functions subject to quadratic constraints: An application in nonlinear bilevel programming ⋮ Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders ⋮ A GENERALIZED OLIGOPOLY MODEL WITH CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS ⋮ On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader-follower game ⋮ Controlled predatory pricing in a multiperiod Stackelberg game: an MPEC approach ⋮ Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm ⋮ A note on Stackelberg competition ⋮ Existence and stability of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium for generalized multiobjective multi-leader-follower games ⋮ Modeling reflexion in the nonlinear model of the Stackelberg three-agent oligopoly for the Russian telecommunication market ⋮ Leadership in singleton congestion games: what is hard and what is easy ⋮ Equilibria in the Stackelberg Oligopoly Reflexive Games with Different Marginal Costs of Agents ⋮ Horizontal mergers mode and controlled policy ⋮ Generic stability of the weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium with strategy transformational barriers ⋮ Defense coordination in security games: equilibrium analysis and mechanism design ⋮ On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games ⋮ A Short State of the Art on Multi-Leader-Follower Games ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography
This page was built for publication: A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis
