Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples
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Publication:6102578
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.011zbMath1519.91137OpenAlexW3135425534MaRDI QIDQ6102578
Publication date: 23 June 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.011
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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