A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109154MaRDI QIDQ777682zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sarvesh Bandhu, Abhinaba Lahiri, Anup Pramanik

Publication date 7 July 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109154

zbMATH Keywords

binary social choicepositive welfare associationstatus quo rulesstrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Recommendations

• Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo
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Cites work

• A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
• A new characterization of the majority rule
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Another characterization of the majority rule.
• Monotonicity + efficiency + continuity = majority
• Nash implementation of the majority rule
• On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives
• On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives
• Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
• Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
• Solidarity and efficiency in preference aggregation: a tale of two rules
• Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo
• Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
• Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
• The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions

Cited in

(9)

• The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
• Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains
• Solidarity and efficiency in preference aggregation: a tale of two rules
• Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
• A note on binary strategy-proof social choice functions
• A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population
• On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: a full characterization
• Isotone classes of social choice functions with binary range
• Binary public decisions with a status quo: undominated mechanisms without harm

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