Bayesian coalitional rationalizability
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- A course in game theory.
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
- Coalitional rationalizability
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
- Dynamically consistent beliefs must be Bayesian
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Foundations of Bayesian theory
- General systems and -stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
- Iterated strict dominance in general games
- Mutually acceptable courses of action
- Rationalizability for social environments
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Revisiting savage in a conditional world
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
- Theories of coalitional rationality
Cited in
(9)- Theories of coalitional rationality
- Rationalizability for social environments
- Iterated elimination procedures
- Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies
- Interval generalization of the Bayesian model of collective decision-making in conflict situations
- Coalitional rationalizability
- Coalitional stochastic stability
- Social rationalizability with mediation
- Maxmin, coalitions and evolution
This page was built for publication: Bayesian coalitional rationalizability
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1001823)