Invariance to representation of information

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.09.004MaRDI QIDQ894617zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Muhamet Yildiz

Publication date 2 December 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/119221

zbMATH Keywords

invarianceequilibriumuniversal type spaceinvariant selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Hierarchies of beliefs and the belief-invariant Bayesian solution
• Making solutions invariant
• Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
• Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence
• Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games

Cites work

• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Axiomatic equilibrium selection for generic two-player games
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Games of incomplete information, ergodic theory, and the measurability of equilibria
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Interactive epistemology and solution concepts for games with asymmetric information
• Interactive epistemology. II: Probability
• On Forward Induction
• On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
• Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Topology-free typology of beliefs

Cited in

(5)

• Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
• When do types induce the same belief hierarchy?
• Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games
• Iterated dominance revisited
• Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability

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