Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.03.006MaRDI QIDQ6102576zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuki Tamura

Publication date 23 June 2023

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.006

zbMATH Keywords

object reallocation problemsobvious strategy-proofnesssingle-dipped preferencesTTC

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
• The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
• Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped
• Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles

Cites work

• A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
• A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
• An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• Matching with single-peaked preferences
• On cores and indivisibility
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities

Cited in

(11)

• Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
• The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
• Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped
• Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof
• Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
• Characterization of top trading cycles with single-dipped preferences
• Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped
• Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
• Efficient reallocation of indivisible resources: pair-efficiency versus Pareto-efficiency
• Obviously strategy-proof implementation for mixed-ownership object-allocation problems
• Endowments-swapping-proof object reallocation with transfers

This page was built for publication: Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6102576)