On dynamic compromise

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.06.009MaRDI QIDQ2276544zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors T. Renee Bowen, Zaki Zahran

Publication date 6 November 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.009

zbMATH Keywords

Markov equilibriadynamic legislative bargainingcompromise

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
• Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Compromise, consensus, and the iteration of means

Cites work

• A theory of constitutional standards and civil liberty
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
• Markov Chains
• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
• On the size and structure of group cooperation
• Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions
• The dynamics of distributive politics

Cited in

(20)

• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
• Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
• Two-party competition with persistent policies
• Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game
• Zero-sum stochastic games with random rules of priority, discrete linear-quadratic model
• Spending-biased legislators: discipline through disagreement
• The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power
• Compromise is key in infinitely repeated bargaining with an evergreen clause
• A `divide and choose' approach to compromising
• Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
• Public good provision in legislatures: the dynamics of enlargements
• Entitlement to assort: democracy, compromise culture and economic stability
• Compromise, consensus, and the iteration of means
• Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
• Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis
• Bilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo
• The dynamics of distributive politics
• LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
• Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
• Personal power dynamics in bargaining

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