Wary of the worst: maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive
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Publication:2411533
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.08.011zbMATH Open1415.91178OpenAlexW2751489129MaRDI QIDQ2411533FDOQ2411533
Publication date: 24 October 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/146446/7/146446.pdf
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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Cited In (1)
Recommendations
- The average-of-awards rule for claims problems π π
- Vigilant measures of risk and the demand for contingent claims π π
- On the number of near-maximum insurance claims π π
- A proportional approach to claims problems with a guaranteed minimum π π
- Protective properties and the constrained equal awards rule for claims problems: A note π π
- Claim Timing andEx PostAdverse Selection π π
- Rationing rules for risky claims π π
- Resource allocations with guaranteed awards in claims problems π π
- Title not available (Why is that?) π π
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