Strategy-proofness and weighted voting

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2010.02.001MaRDI QIDQ991312zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 7 September 2010

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.02.001

zbMATH Keywords

weighted votingstrategy-proofnon-reversal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
• Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
• Weighted voting games
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• Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
• Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
• Strategy-proofness and ``median voters

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
• Nash implementation of the majority rule
• On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
• Social aggregators
• Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem

Cited in

(14)

• Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization
• Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
• Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6389705 (Why is no real title available?)
• Reliability Weighted Voting Games
• Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
• Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
• Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes
• Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
• Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
• There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think
• Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
• Strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams
• Yet another characterization of the majority rule

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