The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
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(32)- Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making
- Social choice in economic environments with dimensional variation
- Arrow's theorem for incomplete relations
- Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
- The birth of social choice theory from the spirit of mathematical logic: Arrow's theorem in the framework of model theory
- Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting
- Should social choice be based on binary comparisons?
- Semiorders and collective choice
- Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
- How mathematical impossibility changed welfare economics: a history of Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension
- Wilson's theorem for economic environments and continuous social preferences
- A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
- Aggregation of preferences: a review
- Kenneth J. Arrow
- Social choice in economic environments
- Can equity be purchased at the expense of efficiency? An axiomatic inquiry
- Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
- Social choice trade-off results for conditions on triples of alternatives
- A further note on Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Arrow's theorem for economic environments and effective social preferences
- Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
- Social welfare functions on restricted economic domains
- Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover
- Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle
- Social choice and individual values in the electronic republic
- Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
- First-order logic formalisation of impossibility theorems in preference aggregation
- Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence
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