Voluntary implementation

DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2752zbMath1103.91325OpenAlexW4240727661MaRDI QIDQ5938631

Matthew O. Jackson, Thomas R. Palfrey

Publication date: 2 July 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-165154639

zbMATH Keywords

implementationindividual rationalitystationary implementationvoluntary implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (12)

Credible implementation ⋮ Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms ⋮ Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent ⋮ Implementation via mechanisms with transfers ⋮ Repeated implementation and complexity considerations ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Nash implementation without no-veto power ⋮ Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation ⋮ Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations ⋮ Voluntary implementation when the planner is a player ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions ⋮ The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation

Cites Work

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• Credible implementation
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Repeated implementation
• Interactive implementation
• Implementing coordinated team play
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining

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