Bounded response of aggregated preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.04.006zbMath1368.91079OpenAlexW2346342679MaRDI QIDQ306731

Shin Sato, Nozomu Muto

Publication date: 1 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.04.006

zbMATH Keywords

independence of irrelevant alternativesArrow's impossibility theorembounded responsesocial welfare function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

A decomposition of strategy-proofness ⋮ Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population ⋮ An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions ⋮ The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population

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