The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
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Publication:309845
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.04.005zbMath1397.91474OpenAlexW2345739716WikidataQ125026638 ScholiaQ125026638MaRDI QIDQ309845
Publication date: 7 September 2016
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.04.005
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