Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0932-5zbMath1367.91113OpenAlexW2226655586MaRDI QIDQ345200

Zhi-Wei Liu

Publication date: 1 December 2016

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0932-5

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmaximin equilibriummaximin preferencesmaximin rational expectations equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (14)

Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Incentive compatibility under ambiguity ⋮ Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity ⋮ Equilibria and incentives in private information economies ⋮ A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility ⋮ Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity ⋮ Dissolving a partnership securely ⋮ On endogenous formation of price expectations ⋮ Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Ambiguous implementation: the partition model ⋮ On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium ⋮ Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation

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