Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities

DOI10.1007/s11238-012-9345-0zbMath1319.91085OpenAlexW2097073495MaRDI QIDQ368060

Isabelle Brocas

Publication date: 18 September 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9345-0

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanism designtype-dependent externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings, Mechanism and Network Design with Private Negative Externalities, Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities, Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities

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