Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games
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Publication:380877
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.005zbMath1274.91067OpenAlexW2034271603MaRDI QIDQ380877
Publication date: 14 November 2013
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000899?np=y
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