The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures

DOI10.1007/S11750-011-0191-YzbMath1282.91033OpenAlexW2152669793MaRDI QIDQ384518

Yoshio Kamijo

Publication date: 28 November 2013

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-011-0191-y

zbMATH Keywords

implementationweighted Shapley valueaxiomatizationcoalition structurecoalition-size weightscollective valuetwo-step Shapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (12)

A value for cooperative games with coalition and probabilistic graph structures ⋮ The balanced contributions property for equal contributors ⋮ A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure ⋮ The in-group egalitarian Owen values ⋮ Games with nested constraints given by a level structure ⋮ Axiomatic of the Shapley value of a game with a priori unions ⋮ The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions ⋮ The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations ⋮ Values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure

Cites Work

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• Weighted coalition structure values
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• Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
• The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
• An implementation of the Owen value.
• Cooperation indices and coalitional value
• A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure
• A value for games with coalition structures
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value

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