Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information

DOI10.1007/S10058-010-0107-6zbMath1278.91073OpenAlexW2034027302MaRDI QIDQ645061

Vasiliki Skreta, Nicolás Figueroa

Publication date: 8 November 2011

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0107-6

zbMATH Keywords

multi-unit auctionsmechanism designexternalitiesinterdependent valuestype-dependent outside options

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Informed seller with taste heterogeneity ⋮ On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure ⋮ Mechanism and Network Design with Private Negative Externalities ⋮ Optimal Nonlinear Pricing in Social Networks Under Asymmetric Network Information

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• A multiple-object auction with superadditive values
• The role of optimal threats in auction design
• A note on optimal allocation mechanisms
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• An optimal auction for complements
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
• Position Auctions with Consumer Search
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations

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