Monotone strategyproofness
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Publication:738926
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.007zbMath1394.91127OpenAlexW4229719986MaRDI QIDQ738926
Guillaume Haeringer, Hanna Halaburda
Publication date: 16 August 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/712.pdf
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Cites Work
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- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
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- On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
- School choice: an experimental study
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- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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