Axioms of invariance for TU-games

DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0458-2zbMath1388.91019OpenAlexW2087121928MaRDI QIDQ891333

Sylvain Béal, Philippe Solal, Eric Rémila

Publication date: 17 November 2015

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2012-01.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueaddition invarianceequal (surplus) division ruletransfer invariance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Characterizations of weighted and equal division values, Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results, Coalitional desirability and the equal division value, Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach, Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value, Value-free reductions, Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions, Nullified equal loss property and equal division values, A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games, Characterization of the average tree solution and its kernel, Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value

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