Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.12.003zbMath1134.91587OpenAlexW1972055005MaRDI QIDQ926786

Simon Wilkie, Steven Callander

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gameslyingelectoral competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (14)

Private polling in elections and voter welfare ⋮ Naive audience and communication bias ⋮ Vagueness in multidimensional proposals ⋮ Competition in costly talk ⋮ Deliberative democracy and electoral competition ⋮ Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling ⋮ Strategic argumentation ⋮ Pandering and electoral competition ⋮ Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty ⋮ Manipulated news model: electoral competition and mass media ⋮ Campaign rhetoric and the hide-and-seek game ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes ⋮ Ideological extremism and primaries ⋮ Learning about challengers

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
• The impact of reelection pressures on the fulfillment of campaign promises
• The equilibrium level of rigidity in a hierarchy
• Partially informative signaling
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

This page was built for publication: Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns