Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0177-4zbMath1155.91359OpenAlexW2009251648MaRDI QIDQ1003094

George Simon Board

Publication date: 26 February 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0177-4

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsinformation revelationbundling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (13)

Mid-auction information acquisition ⋮ Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions ⋮ Dynamic learning and strategic communication ⋮ Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design ⋮ Information revelation in competitive markets ⋮ Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes ⋮ Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information ⋮ Introduction to the symposium ⋮ Mixed bundling in oligopoly markets ⋮ Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction ⋮ Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty ⋮ Information Disclosure and Pricing Policies for Sales of Network Goods ⋮ Efficient dark markets

Cites Work

• Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects
• Mid-auction information acquisition
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Information Acquisition in Auctions

This page was built for publication: Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect