Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor
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Publication:1041961
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2008.05.004zbMath1176.90332OpenAlexW2118159356MaRDI QIDQ1041961
Publication date: 7 December 2009
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2008.05.004
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