On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90094-9zbMath0633.90005MaRDI QIDQ1096516

Tatsuyoshi Saijo

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90094-9

zbMATH Keywords

dual dominance; Maskin monotonic; Nash implementable; unrestricted domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences, Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences, A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction, Preference domains and the monotonicity of Condorcet extensions, Nash implementation with partially honest individuals, Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium, Complexity and repeated implementation, A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences, Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems, The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium., Privacy in implementation, A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation, Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money, Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money, Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition, Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences, Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?, Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments, An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo

Cites Work

• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality