Game theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority

DOI10.1007/BF01770069zbMath0452.90100OpenAlexW2005845210MaRDI QIDQ1148830

J. P. Heaney, Philip D. jun. Straffin

Publication date: 1981

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01770069

zbMATH Keywords

corenucleoluswater managementapplication of game theoryapportioning costs of dam systemsfair allocation of joint costsmaximum propensity to disrupt

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Operations research and management science (90B99)

Related Items (23)

Allocating joint costs by means of the nucleolus ⋮ Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations ⋮ The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods ⋮ A value for partially defined cooperative games ⋮ Upper and lower bounds of the kernel and nucleolus ⋮ Cooperative games with hedonic coalitions ⋮ Resource allocation games: a compromise stable extension of bankruptcy games ⋮ On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion ⋮ Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions ⋮ Cooperative games and cost allocation problems ⋮ Union negotiations: complement-associated games ⋮ Computer science and decision theory ⋮ Parametric axiom of associated consistency ⋮ Compromise values in cooperative game theory ⋮ A review on cost allocation methods in collaborative transportation ⋮ A COMPUTATIONAL APPROACH TO THE COINCIDENCE OF EGALITARIAN SOLUTIONS FOR COST-SHARING GAMES ⋮ Owen's coalitional value and aircraft landing fees ⋮ THE EGALITARIAN NON-k-AVERAGED CONTRIBUTION (EN^kAC-) VALUE FOR TU-GAMES ⋮ AN OVERVIEW ON GAME THEORY APPLICATIONS TO ENGINEERING ⋮ Fair ticket pricing in public transport as a constrained cost allocation game ⋮ Characterizations of a game theoretical cost allocation method ⋮ The \(\tau\)-value, the core and semiconvex games ⋮ A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure

Cites Work

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• The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game
• Complements, mollifiers and the propensity to disrupt
• Cores of convex games
• Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing
• The Cost Assignment of the Cooperative Water Resource Development: A Game Theoretical Approach
• Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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