The core of the matching game

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90017-OzbMath0754.90072MaRDI QIDQ1196648

David Gale, Ahmet U. Alkan

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

corematching gamestrong connectedness property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (17)

Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Groups, collective decisions and markets ⋮ Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects ⋮ Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach ⋮ On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions. ⋮ Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences ⋮ Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule ⋮ Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties ⋮ Coalitional games induced by matching problems: complexity and islands of tractability for the Shapley value ⋮ Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities ⋮ Competitive Equilibria in Two-Sided Matching Markets with General Utility Functions ⋮ Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ Households, markets and public choice ⋮ Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments ⋮ Household formation and markets ⋮ Axiomatization of the core of assignment games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
• The central assignment game and the assignment markets
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• The Core of an N Person Game

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