A learning approach to auctions

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2419zbMath0910.90119OpenAlexW2004521211MaRDI QIDQ1270753

Aner Sela, Shlomit Hon-Snir, Dov Monderer

Publication date: 19 April 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2900/1/dp97_11.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

repeated first-price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions ⋮ Evolutionary stability in first price auctions ⋮ Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ On the convergence of genetic learning in a double auction market ⋮ Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching ⋮ Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited ⋮ Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions ⋮ Brown's original fictitious play

Cites Work

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• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Competitive Bidding: A Comprehensive Bibliography
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers

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