Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication

DOI10.1006/game.1993.1026zbMath0801.90026OpenAlexW2087236790MaRDI QIDQ1308825

Richard O. Beil, Raymond C. Battalio, John B. Van Huyck

Publication date: 6 January 1994

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1026

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gametacit communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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