A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8zbMath0883.90127OpenAlexW1968961993WikidataQ57944323 ScholiaQ57944323MaRDI QIDQ1367854

Dieter Balkenborg, Eyal Winter

Publication date: 1 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(96)00776-8

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfectionbackward inductioncommon knowledgeextensive games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

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