The balanced contributions property for equal contributors

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.08.007zbMath1400.91033OpenAlexW2747981162MaRDI QIDQ1651259

Takumi Kongo, Koji Yokote, Yukihiko Funaki

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.007

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueTU gamesaxiomatizationbalanced contributions property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (12)

The balanced contributions property for equal contributors ⋮ Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions ⋮ Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies ⋮ The in-group egalitarian Owen values ⋮ Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games ⋮ The balanced contributions property for symmetric players ⋮ Uncertainty in cooperative interval games: how Hurwicz criterion compatibility leads to egalitarianism ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian solidarity values ⋮ Weakly balanced contributions and the weighted Shapley values ⋮ Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values ⋮ Marginality and Myerson values ⋮ Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games

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