Two-sided matching problems with externalities

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Publication:1815196

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0077zbMath0859.90011OpenAlexW1974473105MaRDI QIDQ1815196

Hiroo Sasaki, Manabu Toda

Publication date: 10 April 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0077




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