In defense of DEFECT.
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Publication:1864806
DOI10.1006/game.2001.0893zbMath1035.91015OpenAlexW2119426597MaRDI QIDQ1864806
Publication date: 23 March 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/dee3737b33683c26965b9ee16815aca47f9dac53
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