Learning correlated equilibria in population games.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00073-7zbMath1037.91019WikidataQ127704442 ScholiaQ127704442MaRDI QIDQ1867793

Antonella Ianni

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Learning dynamicsCorrelated equilibriaGames with identical interestsPopulation games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Related Items (1)

Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions

Cites Work

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