An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives

DOI10.1007/BF01243036zbMath0844.90119OpenAlexW1992623025MaRDI QIDQ1905051

Güth, Werner

Publication date: 8 September 1996

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01243036

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilityreciprocal behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (27)

Cyclical behavior of evolutionary dynamics in coordination games with changing payoffs ⋮ Evolutionary stability of preferences: altruism, selfishness, and envy ⋮ The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance ⋮ A generalization of Hamilton's rule -- love others how much? ⋮ Evolution of revealing emotions ⋮ Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ Equilibrium vengeance ⋮ An Evolutionary Game Theory Strategy for Carbon Emission Reduction in the Electricity Market ⋮ A note on ``Evolution of preferences ⋮ Labelling, homophily and preference evolution ⋮ Political institutions and the evolution of character traits ⋮ Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation ⋮ Survival of altruistic preferences in a large population public goods game ⋮ Evolution of semi-Kantian preferences in two-player assortative interactions with complete and incomplete information and plasticity ⋮ Evolution of preferences in multiple populations ⋮ Compliance with Social Norms as an Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium ⋮ Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences ⋮ Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli ⋮ An evolutionary analysis of buyer insurance and seller reputation in online markets ⋮ Pretending in dynamic games, alternative outcomes and application to electricity markets ⋮ Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation ⋮ Introducing to the evolution of preferences ⋮ Preference evolution and reciprocity ⋮ Incentives in the family II: behavioral dynamics and the evolution of non-costly signaling ⋮ EXPLAINING PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS BY CONDITIONAL COOPERATION: AN INDIRECT EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH ⋮ Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability ⋮ Elimination of non-individualistic preferences in large population aggregative games

Cites Work

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• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
• Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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