Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.020zbMath1254.91021OpenAlexW1846668434MaRDI QIDQ1925896

Philippe Solal, Eric Rémila, Sylvain Béal

Publication date: 27 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36857/1/MPRA_paper_36857.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessMyerson valuecomponent-wise egalitarian solutionsfairness for neighborstwo-step value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games, Efficient extensions of communication values, An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure, On the existence of efficient and fair extensions of communication values for connected graphs, Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on \(\tau\)-values, Cost sharing on prices for games on graphs, Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure, The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations, Tree solutions and standardness for cycle-free graph games, Efficient extensions of the Myerson value, An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games, The Myerson value for directed graph games, Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value, Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value, Weighted component-wise solutions for graph games, The Myerson value on local structures of coalitions, Solidarity within a fixed community

Cites Work

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• Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems
• A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES
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