Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.015zbMath1275.91087OpenAlexW2072219011MaRDI QIDQ1945831

Takashi Kunimoto, Georgy Artemov, Roberto Serrano

Publication date: 17 April 2013

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2002

zbMATH Keywords

measurabilitymechanism designincentive compatibility\(\Delta \)-rationalizabilityrobust virtual implementationtype diversityWilson doctrine

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44) Social choice (91B14)

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