Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
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Publication:1969020
DOI10.1007/S001990050001zbMath1080.91022OpenAlexW1967886354MaRDI QIDQ1969020
Publication date: 22 June 2000
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050001
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