On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions.

DOI10.1007/s001820050054zbMath1058.91528MaRDI QIDQ1972564

Mitsunobu Miyake

Publication date: 11 April 2000

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050054

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium; perfect equilibrium; dominant strategy equilibrium; Multi-item auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B16: Utility theory

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B50: General equilibrium theory

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Cites Work

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• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
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• The core of the matching game
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities
• Continuous representation of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
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