On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions.
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Publication:1972564
DOI10.1007/S001820050054zbMath1058.91528OpenAlexW2041610826MaRDI QIDQ1972564
Publication date: 11 April 2000
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050054
Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Related Items (10)
Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets ⋮ An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear ⋮ Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity ⋮ Vickrey allocation rule with income effect ⋮ Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations ⋮ Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule ⋮ Descending price multi-item auctions ⋮ Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems ⋮ Simultaneous independent online auctions with discrete bid increments
Cites Work
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- The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity
- On stability of perfect equilibrium points
- The central assignment game and the assignment markets
- The core of the matching game
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities
- Continuous representation of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
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