The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.02.003zbMath1466.91014OpenAlexW3026902186MaRDI QIDQ2031172

László Á. Kóczy, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 8 June 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

coalition structure coresequential dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core

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