Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105274zbMath1470.91134arXiv1908.04336OpenAlexW3163663315MaRDI QIDQ2044984

Jun Zhang, Federico Echenique, Antonio Miralles

Publication date: 11 August 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.04336

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessefficiencyparticipation constraintjustified envypseudo-market equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

Trading probabilities along cycles ⋮ Constrained random matching ⋮ Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments ⋮ Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources

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