Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0834-7zbMath1318.91141OpenAlexW2050750999MaRDI QIDQ2353698

Mridu Prabal Goswami

Publication date: 16 July 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1311.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Non-dictatorial public distribution rules

Cites Work

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